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NOTE AND COMMENT.
ADVERS4 POSSESSION IN THE CASE O THE RIGHTS OF WAY O THE PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANIES.-Wfile the weight of authority is probably to the effect
that railroad rights of way may be lost by adverse possession, the authorities
are by no means agreed. See 12 MICH. L. Rgv. 144. The rights of way of
certain of the Pacific Railroad Companies have been declared not to be
subject to the ordinary rules as to adverse possession, on the ground that
by the Congressional grants the four-hundred-foot-strips -were conveyed only
for railroad purposes with the ultimate possibility of reverter in the United
States, which had the effect of making such lands inalienable by the railroad companies whether by voluntary deed or by lapse of time under the
general statutes of limitation. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Smith, 171 U. S.
267, 43 L. Ed. 16o, 18 Sup. 'Ct. 794; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 19o U. S. 267, 47 L. Ed. lO44, 23 Sup. Ct. 671; Northern Pacific
R. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. I, 49 L. Bd_. 639, 25 Sup. Ct 302. Before the decision
in the last mentioned case an act of Congress (April 28, I9o4) was approved
whereby it was declared "That all conveyances heretofore made by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company or by the Northern Pacific Railway Company,
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of land forming a part of the right of way of the Northern Pacific Railroad,
granted by the Government by any act of Congress, are hereby legalized,
validated, and confirmed: Provided, That no such conveyance shall have
effect to diminish said right of way to a less width than one -hundred feet
on each side of the centre of the -main track of the railroad as now estabThe court -held that under
lished and maintained." 33 Stat. 538, c. 1782.
the provision quoted occupants of the other one hundred feet of the right of
way who had been in adverse possession thereof for the statutory period
acquired ownership, the adverse possession being considered "as tantamount
to a conveyance."
By an act of Congress approved June 24, 1912, (37 Stat. 138) it 'was provided as follows: "That all conveyances or agreements heretofore made by
the Union Pacific Railroad Company," or certain other enumerated railroad
companies, "of or concerning land forming a part of -the right of way * * *
* and all conveyances or agreements congranted by the Government *
fining the limits of said right of way, or restricting the same, are hereby
legalized, validated, and confirmed to the extent that the same would have
been legal or valid if the land involved therein had been held 'by the corporation making the conveyance or agreement under absolute or fee simple
title." If the act 'had concluded at that point, it would seem that its construction would have 'been essentially the same as that given to the act of,
19o4, and an adverse possessor of a portion of the right of way for the required period of time prior to the enactment of the statute twould 'have acquired
absolute ownership. But in the second paragraph it was further declared
"That in all instances in 'which title or ownership of any part of said right
of way heretofore mentioned is claimed as against said corporation, ***
by or through adverse possession of the character and duration prescribed
by the laws of the State in which the land is situated, such adverse possession
shall have the same effect as though the land embraced within the lines of
said right of way had been granted by the United States absolutely or in
fee instead of being granted as a right of way." By § 3 of the Act it was
provided that nothing in the act shall be considered as having the effect to
diminish "said right of way to a less width than, fifty feet on each side of
the center of the main track."
In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Laramie Stock Yards Company,
34 Sup. Ct. IOI, it appeared that the railroad company had brought an action of
ejectment to recover possession of certain lands which 'were within the limits
of the original four-hundred-foot strip granted by the Government; that
defendant company had answered setting up ten years adverse possession
before action instituted and title thereby under act of June 24, 1912; that
plaintiff had demurred to said answer; and that said demurrer had been
overruled, judgment 'being entered that plaintiff "take nothing in said action."
The Supreme 'Court reversed the lower court, holding that the second paragraph of the act of 1912 operated only prospectively, that said act did not
have the effect of vesting title in an adverse possessor whose possession was
prior to the passage of said, act. Much weight was given to the fact that the
first paragraph contained the expression "heretofore made," while nothing
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of that sort appeared in the second paragraph. The two parts of the act of
1912 in question, the one dealing with "conveyances" and "agreements," the
other regarding adverse possessions, were both contained in.one section,
though in separate paragraphs. The first paragraph used the. expression
"heretofore made," and under that provision, if Congress had- stopped there,
the court would have undoubtedly held, following the Ely case, that a
prior adverse possession for the statutory period, had conferred title upon
the possessor. But Congress went on, in the same section, and mentioned
expressly adverse possession, omitting the word "heretofore." No language,
however, expressly looking to the future was used. Admittedly, -as the court
said, it was a question, of construction as -to whether the. adverse possession
paragraph was intended to speak to the past or to -the future. By applying
the general rule that statutes should, unless it appears that the intention was
otherwise, be construed as operating prospectively, the court concluded that
the provision in question looked to the future. It is submitted, that the
history of the legislation, the construction given to the act of 1904, and the
wording of the whole of § i of the act in question showed a contrary intention,
and that the lower court was right.
R. W. A.
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